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Gli ultimi otto messaggi ricevuti dalla Federazione
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@thedarktangent @yawnbox This article is not about email security but about WKD. I have already written about email security and will likely revisit the topic in the near future.
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@tudobem @PierricD It depends on the provider you chose. You can check Netcup or Contabo, which are more affordable options.
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@emanuelegori @attualita e invece come la situazione nei confronti delle retribuzioni tra francia e italia?
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@lennybacon 6/6
So the real question is: migration by evolution or by revolution?
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@lennybacon 5/6
The hard part is backward compatibility: email’s universality is both its strength and its prison. Perhaps the way forward is dual: incremental improvements (e.g., WKD, Autocrypt) to make current email “secure enough,” while simultaneously building truly secure alternatives that could eventually replace SMTP.
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@lennybacon 4/6
Possible directions include:
• MLS (Messaging Layer Security) for federated asynchronous messaging with PFS
• Post-quantum key exchange (already in TLS 1.3 trials)
• Encrypted headers and padding to mitigate traffic analysis
• Ephemeral identities to reduce long-term correlation
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@lennybacon 3/6
And metadata exacerbates the issue: even with PGP/S/MIME, headers expose communication patterns, timestamps, and relationships that can be more revealing than the message content itself. WKD is pragmatic incrementalism: it solves the decades-old “chicken and egg” of key distribution, but it’s still polishing brass on the Titanic. Real progress requires a protocol redesign.
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@lennybacon 2/6
The lack of PFS is indeed critical: every encrypted email becomes a time capsule waiting for quantum computers or a key compromise. Unlike Signal or Matrix, which utilize double-ratchet algorithms to ensure both forward and backward secrecy, email encryption remains static — a single key leak compromises entire email histories.
