Frogblight threatens you with a court case: a new Android banker targets Turkish usersIn August 2025, we discovered a campaign targeting individuals in Turkey with a new Android banking Trojan we dubbed “Frogblight”. Initially, the malware was disguised as an app for accessing court case files via an official government webpage. Later, more universal disguises appeared, such as the Chrome browser.Frogblight can use official government websites as an intermediary step to steal banking credentials. Moreover, it has spyware functionality, such as capabilities to collect SMS messages, a list of installed apps on the device and device filesystem information. It can also send arbitrary SMS messages.Another interesting characteristic of Frogblight is that we’ve seen it updated with new features throughout September. This may indicate that a feature-rich malware app for Android is being developed, which might be distributed under the MaaS model.This threat is detected by Kaspersky products as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Frogblight.*, HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.eq, HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep, HEUR:Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.SmsThief.de.Technical detailsBackgroundWhile performing an analysis of mobile malware we receive from various sources, we discovered several samples belonging to a new malware family. Although these samples appeared to be still under development, they already contained a lot of functionality that allowed this family to be classified as a banking Trojan. As new versions of this malware continued to appear, we began monitoring its development. Moreover, we managed to discover its control panel and based on the “fr0g” name shown there, we dubbed this family “Frogblight”.Initial infectionWe believe that smishing is one of the distribution vectors for Frogblight, and that the users had to install the malware themselves. On the internet, we found complaints from Turkish users about phishing SMS messages convincing users that they were involved in a court case and containing links to download malware. versions of Frogblight, including the very first ones, were disguised as an app for accessing court case files via an official government webpage and were named the same as the files for downloading from the links mentioned above.While looking for online mentions of the names used by the malware, we discovered one of the phishing websites distributing Frogblight, which disguises itself as a website for viewing a court file.The phishing website distributing FrogblightWe were able to open the admin panel of this website, where it was possible to view statistics on Frogblight malware downloads. However, the counter had not been fully implemented and the threat actor could only view the statistics for their own downloads.The admin panel interface of the website from which Frogblight is downloadedAdditionally, we found the source code of this phishing website available in a public GitHub repository. Judging by its description, it is adapted for fast deployment to Vercel, a platform for hosting web apps.The GitHub repository with the phishing website source codeApp featuresAs already mentioned, Frogblight was initially disguised as an app for accessing court case files via an official government webpage. Let’s look at one of the samples using this disguise (9dac23203c12abd60d03e3d26d372253). For analysis, we selected an early sample, but not the first one discovered, in order to demonstrate more complete Frogblight functionality.After starting, the app prompts the victim to grant permissions to send and read SMS messages, and to read from and write to the device’s storage, allegedly needed to show a court file related to the user.The full list of declared permissions in the app manifest file is shown below:MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGEREAD_EXTERNAL_STORAGEWRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGEREAD_SMSRECEIVE_SMSSEND_SMSWRITE_SMSRECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETEDINTERNETQUERY_ALL_PACKAGESBIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICEDISABLE_KEYGUARDFOREGROUND_SERVICEFOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNCPOST_NOTIFICATIONSQUICKBOOT_POWERONRECEIVE_MMSRECEIVE_WAP_PUSHREQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONSSCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARMUSE_EXACT_ALARMVIBRATEWAKE_LOCKACCESS_NETWORK_STATEREAD_PHONE_STATEAfter all required permissions are granted, the malware opens the official government webpage for accessing court case files in WebView, prompting the victim to sign in. There are different sign-in options, one of them via online banking. If the user chooses this method, they are prompted to click on a bank whose online banking app they use and fill out the sign-in form on the bank’s official website. This is what Frogblight is after, so it waits two seconds, then opens the online banking sign-in method regardless of the user’s choice. For each webpage that has finished loading in WebView, Frogblight injects JavaScript code allowing it to capture user input and send it to the C2 via a REST API.The malware also changes its label to “Davalarım” if the Android version is newer than 12; otherwise it hides the icon.The app icon before (left) and after launching (right)In the sample we review in this section, Frogblight uses a REST API for C2 communication, implemented using the Retrofit library. The malicious app pings the C2 server every two seconds in foreground, and if no error is returned, it calls the REST API client methods fetchOutbox and getFileCommands. Other methods are called when specific events occur, for example, after the device screen is turned on, the com.capcuttup.refresh.PersistentService foreground service is launched, or an SMS is received. The full list of all REST API client methods with parameters and descriptions is shown below.REST API client methodDescriptionParametersfetchOutboxRequest message content to be sent via SMS or displayed in a notificationdevice_id: unique Android device IDackOutboxSend the results of processing a message received after calling the API method fetchOutboxdevice_id: unique Android device IDmsg_id: message IDstatus: message processing statuserror: message processing errorgetAllPackagesRequest the names of app packages whose launch should open a website in WebView to capture user input dataaction: same as the API method namegetPackageUrlRequest the website URL that will be opened in WebView when the app with the specified package name is launchedaction: same as the API method namepackage: the package name of the target appgetFileCommandsRequest commands for file operationsAvailable commands:● download: upload the target file to the C2● generate_thumbnails: generate thumbnails from the image files in the target directory and upload them to the C2● list: send information about all files in the target directory to the C2● thumbnail: generate a thumbnail from the target image file and upload it to the C2device_id: unique Android device IDpingDeviceCheck the C2 connectiondevice_id: unique Android device IDreportHijackSuccessSend captured user input data from the website opened in a WebView when the app with the specified package name is launchedaction: same as the API method namepackage: the package name of the target appdata: captured user input datasaveAppListSend information about the apps installed on the devicedevice_id: unique Android device ID app_list: a list of apps installed on the deviceapp_count: a count of apps installed on the devicesaveInjectionSend captured user input data from the website opened in a WebView. If it was not opened following the launch of the target app, the app_name parameter is determined based on the opened URLdevice_id: unique Android device ID app_name: the package name of the target appform_data: captured user input datasavePermissionUnused but presumably needed for sending information about permissionsdevice_id: unique Android device ID permission_type: permission typestatus: permission statussendSmsSend information about an SMS message from the devicedevice_id: unique Android device ID sender: the sender’s/recipient’s phone numbermessage: message texttimestamp: received/sent timetype: message type (inbox/sent)sendTelegramMessageSend captured user input data from the webpages opened by Frogblight in WebViewdevice_id: unique Android device IDurl: website URLtitle: website page titleinput_type: the type of user input datainput_value: user input datafinal_value: user input data with additional informationtimestamp: the time of data captureip_address: user IP addresssms_permission: whether SMS permission is grantedfile_manager_permission: whether file access permission is grantedupdateDeviceSend information about the devicedevice_id: unique Android device IDmodel: device manufacturer and modelandroid_version: Android versionphone_number: user phone numberbattery: current battery levelcharging: device charging statusscreen_status: screen on/offip_address: user IP addresssms_permission: whether SMS permission is grantedfile_manager_permission: whether file access permission is grantedupdatePermissionStatusSend information about permissionsdevice_id: unique Android device IDpermission_type: permission typestatus: permission statustimestamp: current timeuploadBatchThumbnailsUpload thumbnails to the C2device_id: unique Android device IDthumbnails: thumbnailsuploadFileUpload a file to the C2device_id: unique Android device IDfile_path: file pathdownload_id: the file ID on the C2The file itself is sent as an unnamed parameteruploadFileListSend information about all files in the target directorydevice_id: unique Android device IDpath: directory pathfile_list: information about the files in the target directoryuploadFileListLogSend information about all files in the target directory to an endpoint different from uploadFileListdevice_id: unique Android device IDpath: directory pathfile_list: information about the files in the target directoryuploadThumbnailLogUnused but presumably needed for uploading thumbnails to an endpoint different from uploadBatchThumbnailsdevice_id: unique Android device IDthumbnails: thumbnailsRemote device control, persistence, and protection against deletionThe app includes several classes to provide the threat actor with remote access to the infected device, gain persistence, and protect the malicious app from being deleted.capcuttup.refresh.AccessibilityAutoClickServiceThis is intended to prevent removal of the app and to open websites specified by the threat actor in WebView upon target apps startup. It is present in the sample we review, but is no longer in use and deleted in further versions.capcuttup.refresh.PersistentServiceThis is a service whose main purpose is to interact with the C2 and to make malicious tasks persistent.capcuttup.refresh.BootReceiverThis is a broadcast receiver responsible for setting up the persistence mechanisms, such as job scheduling and setting alarms, after device boot completion.Further developmentIn later versions, new functionality was added, and some of the more recent Frogblight variants disguised themselves as the Chrome browser. Let’s look at one of the fake Chrome samples (d7d15e02a9cd94c8ab00c043aef55aff).In this sample, new REST API client methods have been added for interacting with the C2.REST API client methodDescriptionParametersgetContactCommandsGet commands to perform actions with contactsAvailable commands:● ADD_CONTACT: add a contact to the user device● DELETE_CONTACT: delete a contact from the user device● EDIT_CONTACT: edit a contact on the user devicedevice_id: unique Android device IDsendCallLogsSend call logs to the C2device_id: unique Android device IDcall_logs: call log datasendNotificationLogsSend notifications log to the C2. Not fully implemented in this sample, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this API methodaction: same as the API method namenotifications: notification log dataAlso, the threat actor had implemented a custom input method for recording keystrokes to a file using the com.puzzlesnap.quickgame.CustomKeyboardService service.Another Frogblight sample we observed trying to avoid emulators and using geofencing techniques is 115fbdc312edd4696d6330a62c181f35. In this sample, Frogblight checks the environment (for example, device model) and shuts down if it detects an emulator or if the device is located in the United States.Part of the code responsible for avoiding Frogblight running in an undesirable environmentLater on, the threat actor decided to start using a web socket instead of the REST API. Let’s see an example of this in one of the recent samples (08a3b1fb2d1abbdbdd60feb8411a12c7). This sample is disguised as an app for receiving social support via an official government webpage. The feature set of this sample is very similar to the previous ones, with several new capabilities added. Commands are transmitted over a web socket using the JSON format. A command template is shown below:{ "id": <command ID>, "command_type": <command name> "command_data": <command data>}It is also worth noting that some commands in this version share the same meaning but have different structures, and the functionality of certain commands has not been fully implemented yet. This indicates that Frogblight was under active development at the time of our research, and since no its activity was noticed after September, it is possible that the malware is being finalized to a fully operational state before continuing to infect users’ devices. A full list of commands with their parameters and description is shown below:CommandDescriptionParametersconnectSend a registration message to the C2–connection_successSend various information, such as call logs, to the C2; start pinging the C2 and requesting commands–auth_errorLog info about an invalid login key to the Android log system–pong_deviceDoes nothing–commands_listExecute commandsList of commandssms_send_commandSend an arbitrary SMS messagerecipient: message destinationmessage: message textmsg_id: message IDbulk_sms_commandSend an arbitrary SMS message to multiple recipientsrecipients: message destinationsmessage: message textget_contacts_commandSend all contacts to the C2–get_app_list_commandSend information about the apps installed on the device to the C2–get_files_commandSend information about all files in certain directories to the C2–get_call_logs_commandSend call logs to the C2–get_notifications_commandSend a notifications log to the C2. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command–take_screenshot_commandTake a screenshot. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command–update_deviceSend registration message to the C2–new_webview_dataCollect WebView data. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command–new_injectionInject code. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this commandcode: injected codetarget_app: presumably the package name of the target appadd_contact_commandAdd a contact to the user devicename: contact namephone: contact phoneemail: contact emailcontact_addAdd a contact to the user devicedisplay_name: contact namephone_number: contact phoneemail: contact emailcontact_deleteDelete a contact from the user devicephone_number: contact phonecontact_editEdit a contact on the user devicedisplay_name: new contact namephone_number: contact phoneemail: new contact emailcontact_listSend all contacts to the C2–file_listSend information about all files in the specified directory to the C2path: directory pathfile_downloadUpload the specified file to the C2file_path: file pathdownload_id: an ID that is received with the command and sent back to the C2 along with the requested file. Most likely, this is used to organize data on the C2file_thumbnailGenerate a thumbnail from the target image file and upload it to the C2file_path: image file pathfile_thumbnailsGenerate thumbnails from the image files in the target directory and upload them to the C2folder_path: directory pathhealth_checkSend information about the current device state: battery level, screen state, and so on–message_list_requestSend all SMS messages to the C2–notification_sendShow an arbitrary notificationtitle: notification titlemessage: notification messageapp_name: notification subtextpackage_list_responseSave the target package namespackages: a list of all target package names.Each list element contains:package_name: target package nameactive: whether targeting is activedelete_contact_commandDelete a contact from the user device. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this commandcontact_id: contact IDname: contact namefile_upload_commandUpload specified file to the C2. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this commandfile_path: file pathfile_name: file namefile_download_commandDownload file to user device. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this commandfile_url: the URL of the file to downloaddownload_path: download pathdownload_file_commandDownload file to user device. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this commandfile_url: the URL of the file to downloaddownload_path: downloading pathget_permissions_commandSend a registration message to the C2, including info about specific permissions–health_check_commandSend information about the current device state, such as battery level, screen state, and so on–connect_errorLog info about connection errors to the Android log systemA list of errorsreconnectSend a registration message to the C2–disconnectStop pinging the C2 and requesting commands from it–Authentication via WebSocket takes place using a special key.The part of the code responsible for the WebSocket authentication logicAt the IP address to which the WebSocket connection was made, the Frogblight web panel was accessible, which accepted the authentication key mentioned above. Since only samples using the same key as the webpanel login are controllable through it, we suggest that Frogblight might be distributed under the MaaS model.The interface of the sign-in screen for the Frogblight web panelJudging by the menu options, the threat actor can sort victims’ devices by certain parameters, such as the presence of banking apps on the device, and send bulk SMS messages and perform other mass actions.VictimsSince some versions of Frogblight opened the Turkish government webpage to collect user-entered data on Turkish banks’ websites, we assume with high confidence that it is aimed mainly at users from Turkey. Also, based on our telemetry, the majority of users attacked by Frogblight are located in that country.AttributionEven though it is not possible to provide an attribution to any known threat actor based on the information available, during our analysis of the Frogblight Android malware and the search for online mentions of the names it uses, we discovered a GitHub profile containing repos with Frogblight, which had also created repos with Coper malware, distributed under the MaaS model. It is possible that this profile belongs to the attackers distributing Coper who have also started distributing Frogblight.GitHub repositories containing Frogblight and Coper malwareAlso, since the comments in the Frogblight code are written in Turkish, we believe that its developers speak this language.ConclusionsThe new Android malware we dubbed “Frogblight” appeared recently and targets mainly users from Turkey. This is an advanced banking Trojan aimed at stealing money. It has already infected real users’ devices, and it doesn’t stop there, adding more and more new features in the new versions that appear. It can be made more dangerous by the fact that it may be used by attackers who already have experience distributing malware. We will continue to monitor its development.Indicators of CompromiseMore indicators of compromise, as well as any updates to these, are available to the customers of our crimeware reporting service. If you are interested, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.APK file hashes8483037dcbf14ad8197e7b23b04aea34105fa36e6f97977587a8298abc31282ae1cd59ae3995309627b6ab3ae8071e80115fbdc312edd4696d6330a62c181f3508a3b1fb2d1abbdbdd60feb8411a12c7d7d15e02a9cd94c8ab00c043aef55aff9dac23203c12abd60d03e3d26d372253C2 domains1249124fr1241og5121.sa[.]comfroglive[.]netC2 IPs45.138.16.208[:]8080URL of GitHub repository with Frogblight phishing website source codehttps://github[.]com/eraykarakaya0020/e-ifade-vercelURL of GitHub account containing APK files of Frogblight and Coperhttps://github[.]com/ChromeapkDistribution URLshttps://farketmez37[.]cfd/e-ifade.apkhttps://farketmez36[.]sbs/e-ifade.apkhttps://e-ifade-app-5gheb8jc.devinapps[.]com/e-ifade.apksecurelist.com/frogblight-bank…
