the fact that Apple and Google are both lobbying hard against the EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA) gives me the sense that it's working as intended#apple #google #DMA #EU

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@rune same, I just hope people aren't so naive as to buy it

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@rune in case any tech reporters want help writing a headline:

"Thrice-convicted Monopolist Claims Regulation Harms Consumers"

[rune@social.sound-city.dk]

@ansuz the only bad regulations are the ones lobbied for by large corporations

[naturemc@mastodon.online]

@ansuz Indeed, it is. They are quite offen fined to pay millions of dollars under the GDPR already. In the beginning they thought they could just pay from petty cash but it becomes more and more expensive. In April 2025, Apple and Meta became the first companies to be penalized for violating the Digital Markets Act. Apple was fined 500 million euros ($570 million) and Meta was fined 200 million euros ($230 million) respectively.

[heals@indiepocalypse.social]

@ansuz the fact that any bigger company can now request access to your previously private data and call it a DMA access request (and get it granted almost all the time) gives me the sense that no one in the EU council has thought it through..

/cc @ainmosni

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@heals @ainmosni my understanding is that it can only be requested with the authorization of concerned parties, but it's been a while since I've read the text

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@heals @ainmosni points 9 and 10 contain the relevant text and are described here: https://www.eu-digital-markets-act.com/Digital_Markets_Act_Article_6.html

[heals@indiepocalypse.social]

@ansuz so lets say I use an e2ee encrypted messenger and the provider of that messenger thus cannot read or decrypt my messages.

They could under that clause request realtime access to data generated by the platform core service used for push notifications / device notifications for their app - which are generally displayed to me unencrypted and tada, e2ee and at the same time readable plaintext for the provider of the messenger?

I know that’ll imply a certain degree of bad intent from the provider but reading over article 9 it also sounds entirely within the realm of things you’d be allowed to do unless you anyone can prove that all notifications would classify as personally identifiable data that needs my permission to collect and process?

/cc @ainmosni

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@heals @ainmosni I don't think that's the case unless a service which can access your messages prompts you for consent for that information to be shared and you agree.

as a sidenote, I don't think it can be called e2ee if the notification provider is able to exfiltrate message contents

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@heals @ainmosni but I understand why people might think such scenarios will be possible under the DMA, because the "gatekeeper" corporations are doing their best to spread as many lies as possible

[heals@indiepocalypse.social]

@ansuz the notification provider isn’t able to decrypt your messages - that’s the catch. The messenger on your device can decrypt the message and send a local notification for you which normally none else can access 😅

As for the consent - yeah that’s the grey area here.. Notifications is a core service but access to that data shouldn’t be allowed to anyone really.
But it’s hard to say if all of the messages you get would classify as personal data (think things like WhatsApp news broadcasts) but generally they can’t be classified either without scanning the content and then we spin in a nasty circle 😐

The DMA has its good ideas - no arguing on that- but certain areas still feel problematic / not completely thought through (like scope of application.. gatekeepers are obligated, non gatekeepers aren’t.. why not apply it equally to all businesses that provide comparable services or technologies?)

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@heals I understand the distinction, but if there's a chance of notification contents leaving the device then consent is required. That's what I meant by exfiltration. If that's the default then I think it's unfair to call such systems e2ee, regardless of the messenger's encryption, because as a system it fails to meet such guarantees.

I think the issues you're raising will largely come down to how the DMA is enforced. Many of the initial interpretations of the GDPR were wildly incorrect as well, and it took years of legal cases to show that such creative interpretations of its text were very illegal.

I expect that's what we'll see over the next few years as long as lobbying like this does not prompt any concessions from legislators.

[heals@indiepocalypse.social]

@ansuz I’m afraid to wait and see..

The base idea of the DMA is nice but the EU being the EU they always backe things into laws that aren’t fully cooked and it takes the years you mention just to realise that and maybe amend / fix things (not including the GDPR, that one was actually nicely done).

It’s scary to think that the same people are on a happy course to kick-off ChatControl and feel great about it
:(

[ansuz@social.cryptography.dog]

@heals I think they tend to be more clear about the spirit of their laws than the exact text. the problems arise when American corporations do their best bad-faith interpretation of the text while ignoring the stated intentions of the laws, because that's closer to how the US legal system works 🤷 if you just keep in mind what such laws were supposed to accomplish when interpreting them, none of the rulings have really been that surprising.

chatcontrol seems to me like a special beast because it has strong ties to American lobbyists that are in its favour, rather than being intended as a way to regulate them. it's also different in that constitutional lawyers have said will be illegal according to existing law even if legislated, so at least there's that